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Imperatives as Underquantified Propositions 
Eleni Staraki 
 
1.  Introduction  
When we issue an order or express a request or a suggestion with an imperative we are also able to 
rephrase the proposition by using a deontic modal expression. The same is true for deontic modal 
expressions which can be rephrased with an imperative proposition. Think of the following examples: 
(1)  a.  Akugh-e  tus ghonis  su     order (∀) 
Listen-2sg.IMP the parents  your 
Listen to your parents! 
b.  Prepi   na akus   tus ghonis  su.   deontic 
Must-3sg.INP  to listen.2sg  the parents  your 
You have to listen to your parents. 
In the examples shown in (1a) the sentence containing an imperative expresses an order (and in other 
situations an instruction or a command) can be rephrased to the sentence in (1b) which contains a 
deontic modal prepi ‘have to’ and expresses how the world ought to be according to certain norms 
established by society or individual. Conceptually, there is no difference when substituting an 
imperative with a deontic modal or a deontic modal with an imperative. Requesting, giving the 
permission or the opportunity to someone or expressing the willingness to achieve something can also 
be rephrased to a bouletic sentence with no much difference in meaning, for example: 
(2)  a.  Pare    ena sokalataki!    invitation (∃) 
Take-3sg.IMP  one chocolate 
Have a chocolate! 
b.  Boris   na paris  ena sokolataki.    bouletic  
May-2sg.INP  to  take one chocolate 
You may / should have a chocolate 
 
The bouletic sentence (2b) that signifies how the world can be according to the desires and/or 
requests of society or individual shares the same meaning with the sentence in (2a) which contains an 
imperative expressing one’s invitation (a desire, a request).  
Finally, indicating or proposing how the world should be with an imperative (3a) does not differ 
much from the sentence in (3b) which means the same thing but with a deontic modal tha prepi 
‘should’, for example: 
 
(3)  a.  Kane    pio  sihna dhialimata     suggestion (∃) 
Make-2sg.IMP  more  often  breaks 
Take a break more often. 
b.  (Tha) prepi   na  kanis pio    sihna dhialimata   teleological 
(FUT) must-3sg.INP to  make more often breaks 
You should take a break more often. 
In this paper however we will see that despite the interpretational relation between imperatives and 
deontic modality, imperatives constitute a distinct case of an underquantified modal operator which 
receives a wide range of interpretations, represent as either with a universal or an existential quantifier 
(see (1) – (3)), due to its underquantified modal base.  
2.  Current Theories 
  
The common assumption of treating imperatives and deontic modality in a similar way is shared by 
two different theoretical approaches: (1) Dynamic theories and (2) Modal theories. 
2.1  Dynamic theories  
Portner (2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2012) argues that imperatives, on the one hand, are not propositions 
but properties added to the To-Do-List (TDL henceforth) which represents the requirements that an 
addressee in discourse has to and will bring about. Deontic modals, on the other hand, such as must 
should be treated on a par with imperatives as they contain an imperative-like component that ensures 
the performative (speech act) meaning of a modal expression. In other words, the covert imperative-
like component a deontic modal contains signifies that the speaker attempts to achieve something by 
uttering a locution. In such an approach deontic modals add requirements to the TDL of an addressee 
(Ninan 2005; Portner 2007, 2009) who, in turn, is committed to realize them, for example:  
To-Do-List 
A set of properties assigned to be met by the addressee, induces a partial order on the set of 
possible worlds and indicates what the highest priority amongst others for the addressee is. 
  Pragmatic Function of Priority Modals: 
A To-Do-List function T assigns to each participant (addressee) α in the conversation a set of 
properties T (α) (s)he is committed to fulfill. 
The analysis offered by Portner treats imperatives as a strict commitment from both speaker and 
addressee in committing themselves to the realization of what was uttered allowing no deviations. 
However, the imperative concept is quite different in natural languages. Imperatives express an 
intention to influence one’s actions and behavior but they do not commit to the planning out or even 
more, to the realization of an intention. Issuing an imperative does not mean that there is in fact a norm 
under which an order has been licensed, for example: 
(4) a. Has-u apo ta matia mu      # Ise ipohreomenos na hathis apo ta matia mu 
                Lost-2sg.IMP from the eyes my 
                Get out of my eyes 
 b. Get lost     # You are obligated to get lost 
Similarly, expressing a deontic modal expression does not mean that the speaker issues an order, 
although there might be a norm under which the deontic modal expression was uttered. The speaker 
might use the deontic modal expression to attract attention or action towards a goal and not an actual 
intention to influence, for example: 
(5) a. Prep-i na djavasis to mathima su      Djavase to mathima su   
     Must-3sg.INP to study the homework 
    You have to do your homework   
b. You have to do your homework     Do your homework 
Dynamic theories cannot accommodate cases where imperatives and deontic modality deviate 
from what is considered likely. Thus, we seek an analysis which incorporates the deviations in meaning 
that both imperatives and deontic modal verbs offer.  
 
2.2  Modal theories 
  
In the second approach, imperatives contain a covert modal operator (Han 1998, 1999, 2001) which is 
either always universal and existential readings are derived via pragmatics (Schwager 2005a, 2005b, 
2006a; as Kaufmann 2012) or ambiguous between an existential and a universal reading (Grosz 2008b, 
2011). Imperatives have the prototypical function of ORDER and they are reduced to a should-clause 
(see Hamblin 1987; Kaufmann 2012: Hypothesis 2.4 you should-reduction). There are two distinct 
levels in the logical form that modal theories adopt, for example:  
(6)  a. Directive Force which turns the proposition into a directive action which in turn is added to 
addressee’s Plan Set (what the addressee has to fulfill) (Han 1998, 1999, 2001) 
b. Modal Component which expresses the irrealis mood and is interpreted with the modal 
force of a deontic modal (Han 1998, 1999, 2001). 
There are two issues with the modal approach. On the one hand, imperatives, as we will see in 
more detail later in the discussion, are neither universal nor existential quantifiers. Deontic modals, on 
the contrary, are by default universal (for example, prepi ‘have to’) or existential (for example, bori 
‘may’) quantifiers. Imperatives can be interpreted as either universal quantifiers when an order is 
issued or as existential quantifiers when a request, proffer and prompt are uttered. Analyzing 
imperatives as ambiguous quantifiers would load the underlying logical form with unnecessary 
transformations from the default function of ORDER to particulars for each possible interpretation, 
thus proliferating the semantics of imperatives. On the other hand, the irrealis component does not 
incorporate the concept of no-commitment, because it just expresses the state of being insubstantial or 
imaginary; the quality of being unreal. Imperatives and deontic modal verbs, on the contrary, involve 
the intention to influence, guide and probably carry out an action or a plan according to norms and 
desires.  
3.  The Data: Imperatives and Deontic Modality in Greek 
Personal boro ‘may/can’ conveys permission, concession or request in Greek, for example: 
(7)  a.  An   thelete   borite   na  ton  episkefthite 
  If want.2pl.INP may  SUBJ  him  visit.2.pl.PNP 
If  you want  you can / may  visit him. 
b.  Boro   na  episkeftho  ton Pavlo? 
 Can.1sg.INP  SUBJ  visit.1pl.PNP the Paul 
May / Can I  visit Paul? 
c.  Boris   na  klisis   to  parathiro? 
Can.2sg.INP  SUBJ close.2sg.PNP the  window 
Can you  close the window? 
When in third person singular bori ‘may/can’ it expresses ability, possibility, permission or concession, 
for example: 
(8)  a.  O Pavlos  bori    na  taksidhepsi    avrio 
The Paul  may/can.3sg.INP  SUBJ travel.3sg.PNP tomorrow 
i. It is possible that …    possibility 
ii. Pavlos is able to …    ability 
  
iii. Pavlos is permitted to …    permission 
Impersonal verb prepi ‘must/should’ conveys necessity, for example: 
(9)  a.  Prepi  na  milisume 
Must.3sg.INP  to  talk.1pl.PNP 
We have to / should talk. 
The functional heterogeneity of imperatives in Greek but also in other languages (see Schmerling 
1982; Kaufmann 2012; among others) is impressive, and varies between a universal (order, obligation, 
etc.) and an existential quantification (wish, request, advice, etc.). Imperatives in Greek are expressed 
only in 2nd singular and plural person with the respective imperative verbal suffixes at the end of the 
verb root, for example: 
(10)  a.  Katev – a  kato  amesos!    Order 
Get.2sg.PP  down  right away 
Get down right away! 
b.  El – a   kata  tis  pende     permission 
Come.2sg.PP around  the  five 
Come around five. 
c.  Par – te  ena sokolataki    suggestion/invitation 
 Take.2pl.PP  one chocolate 
Have a bar of chocolate 
3.1  No generalized pattern 
Greek and English data in this section provide counterarguments to dynamic and modal theories. I will 
focus on a set of minimal pairs that show where and why imperatives and deontic modality differ.  
3.1.1  Assertion or Evaluation of Truth 
The propositional status of imperatives and deontic propositions is different. While both kinds of 
propositions involve truth state, imperatives assert the truth and deontic modal propositions evaluate 
the truth, for example: 
(11)  a.  # Eksafanisu apo brosta mu! Ala min to kanis. Truth Assertion  
   Lost-2sg.IMP from in front mine! But not it do.2sg.PNP 
                    Get out of my sight! But don’t do it.  
b.  # Get out of my sight! But don’t do it. 
Using an imperative proposition the speaker asserts the truth of a necessity or permission and this is 
why imperatives disallow commitment inconsistencies on the part of a speaker and become infelicitous 
in context when they are negated.  
On the contrary, when we use a deontic modal expression a speaker assess the degree of the truth 
of a necessity or permission. Thus, a deontic modal expression can be negated with no contradiction as 
a result, for example: 
  
 
(12) c.  Prepi               na zitisis sighnomi ala  min to kanis!          Truth Evaluation  
Must-3sg.INP to apologize           but  not  the  do-2sg.INP 
You should apologize but don’t do it! 
 
d. You must apologize but don’t do it! 
 
 
3.1.2  Commitment to Realization  
When I utter an expression with a deontic modal of the form prepi na ‘I must ϕ’ I am not expressing 
any commitment to ϕ and I might also very well believe that dhen prepi na  ‘I won’t ϕ’. What I 
convey with any type of deontic modality and imperative as well is a goal, an ideal that is required by 
some social or personal norm to be achieved. However, acknowledging a norm is completely different 
from actually submitting to it and actualizing it. Nothing commits me or any participant to its truth. 
Thus, imperatives and deontic modal verbs are non-veridical. Non-veridicality (see Giannakidou 1998) 
is the concept indicating that a certain situation or action is not known to commit the speaker and/or the 
addressee to its realization; more formally: A proposition is non-veridical if and only if it does not 
entail or presuppose that p is true in some individual’s deontic model MD(x), for example: 
(13)  a.  Eksafanisu apo brosta mu!     Tha eksafanistis sighura 
Get out of my sight!   You will in fact get out of my sight 
b.  Prepi na zitisis sighnomi    Tha zitisis signomi sighura 
You must apologize     You will in fact apologize 
 
3.1.3 Speaker’s Ordering Source  
The ordering source is one of the parameters in interpreting modality. Ordering source g(w) determines 
what is an obligation or permission and orders the worlds in the modal base ∩f(w) with respect to the 
set of propositions that are either obligatory or permissible (Kratzer 1981, 1991). According to Kratzer, 
the ordering source of modal propositions in general is contextual. This constraint delimits the set of 
possible permutations within the ordering source. Thus a contextual ordering source yields to a 
contradiction, see example with deontic modals, when the modal base is ordered in multiple ways. The 
case of imperatives is different. The ordering source depends on the speaker; meaning that the ordering 
permutations on the modal base depend on the speaker, and this is why there is no contradiction when 
using an imperative proposition. Let’s see the next example:  
 (14) a.  Stripse aristera. Stripse deksia. De me endiaferi! 
  Take-2sg.IMP a left.  Take-2sg.IMP a right. I don’t care! 
Take a left. Take a right. I don’t care 
Paraphrase: I’m indifferent as to where you turn. 
 b. # Prepi na pas                aristera. Prepi na  pas deksia.  
   Have to  take.2sg.INP a left.     Have to  take.2sg.INP a right.  
 
De  me  endiaferi! 
Not  I  care! 
 
#You have to take a left. You have to take a right. I don’t care. 
  
 c.  # Boris na pas aristera. Boris na pas deksia. De me endiaferi! 
May  take.2sg.INP a left. May take.2sg.INP a right.  
 
De  me  endiaferi! 
Not  I  care! 
# You may go left. You may go right. I don’t care! 
 
3.1.4 Modal Force 
Imperatives do not have a predetermined modal force (see Portner; Kaufmann; among others). Those 
imperatives that convey obligations are universal quantifiers and those that grant permission are 
existential quantifiers. On the contrary, Greek and English modal verbs likewise lexically encode 
modal force as either existential quantification in bori ‘may / can’ or universal quantification in prepi 
‘must’ over possible worlds:  
(15)  a. Stripste aristera!    …as a direction ∀ or suggestion ∃ 
  Take-2sg.IMP a left 
Take a left turn! 
 b. i. # Borite (∃) / Prepi (∀) na stripsete aristera  
        Can-2pl.INP / Must-3sg.INP take a left    
                             You # can / must take a left turn.  
…as a direction by your driving instructor when taking the class 
ii. Borite / # Prepi na stripsete aristera  
                           Can-2pl.INP / Must-3sg.INP take a left    
                           You can / # must take a left turn. 
…as a suggestion by your driving instructor on a trip 
 
Contrary to current theories, I propose that imperatives are underquantified modals. The approach 
I argue for in this paper is that the modal base of imperatives is underquantified because imperatives do 
not have a lexically specified modal force1. To sum up, in this section, I explained why imperatives 
exhibit a wide range of quantified expressions varying from universal to existential to indifference 
readings. It is because imperatives incorporate an underquantified modal base and an ordering source 
the permutations of which are determined by the individual’s preferences.   
4.  Analysis  
The analysis of imperatives I propose here is based on two levels. There is a descriptive use level 
which involves the semantic components that should be taken into account and a performative use level 
which is about all those pragmatic, contextual factors involved in the interpretation.  
                                                           
1
 In Kratzer’s theory, modal base is the intersection of the accessible worlds a modal quantifies over considering 
that a modal has a lexically specified modal force (universal or existential). 
  
4.1  Underquantification 
For the descriptive level I use a modified parameters set. I consider modal base as the set of 
propositions that form the basis of truth evaluation. Those propositions might be a set of norms, 
expectations, desires or a set of goals. Modal base is that set of propositions that form the basis of truth 
evaluation, and modal force is the result of the truth evaluation on the modal base. Thus, there is a 
direct connection between modal base and modal force; the first parameter determines what the kind of 
the second parameters will be.   
Now, the modal force, universal or existential quantifier, is predetermined for deontic modals.  
Deontic prepi ‘have / should to’ is a universal quantifier that is to say that a deontically necessary 
action is true for every possible world. On the other hand bori ‘may/might’ is existential which means 
that a deontically permissible action is true in at least one possible world. For imperatives, I propose 
that their modal base is underquantified which means it’s not either universal or existential by default, 
and it is not ambiguous. Imperatives have a non-partitioned quantificational domain. In other words, 
their modal base is non-partitioned till the moment the speaker crucial decision which I will be 
explaining soon. 
 
MODAL FORCE:    BORI   →  ∃ 
     PREPI   →  ∀ 
     IMPERATIVES   → Underquantified2 
 
To partition a domain of quantification, I employ a speaker’s ordering source which selects a 
subset of the set of propositions, the modal base on which the quantifier will quantify over:  
 
ORDERING SOURCE:   BORI   →  Contextual 
     PREPI   →  Contextual 
     IMPERATIVES  → Speaker dependant  
 
Definition 1.1 Quantificational Domain.  If the modal base f(w)  is the set of all propositions, then a 
non-partitioned quantificational domain DQ is the subset of a modal base f(w) selected by the speaker’s 
ordering source ≤g agentive, formally: 
DQ = ∃DQ [DQ ⊆ ( f(w)) ∧ (≤g speaker (DQ)) ∧ Q( f(w)), ≤g speaker)] 
Where DQ = Quantificational Domain 
 
Definition in (1.1) represents the non-partitioned quantificational domain DQ on which ≤g speaker  
ordering source maps the preferences of an individual onto the quantificational domain in order to 
determine the kind of partition; universal or existential. Q is the quantifier placeholder which is not 
defined in (1.1) yet. Partition will determine the value of the placeholder Q. The quantificational 
domain is the set of all those things that one might be talking about. In imperatives speaker restricts 
that domain according to what (s)he want to issue, may that be an order,  a wish or a desired goal. 
Imperatives represent the speaker’s subjective commitment to the truth assertion of a proposition 
uttered. This leads us to the next definition which clarifies how a quantificational domain is restricted.  
 
Definition 1.2 Existential Quantification. If there are at least some deontically possible worlds 
then the domain of quantification is existentially quantified. 
If DQ < (f(w)  ≤g speaker) then DQ is existentially quantified 
 
                                                           
2
 Underquantified means that the modal force is not prespecified and that the modal base is not partitioned 
  
If the speaker according to his/her goals restricts the quantificational domain to some deontically 
possible worlds then the imperative is translated as a wish or a desire. For example, consider stripse 
aristera ‘Take a left’ when this is aimed as an advice. More formally this is interpreted as: It is true that 
there is at least one deontically possible world where stripse aristera ‘Take a left’ is true. Imperatives 
in this case do not have the rigidness of an order.  
 
Definition 1.3 Universal Quantification. If the domain of quantification then the domain of 
quantification overlaps with the set of all deontically possible worlds then it is universally quantified. 
If DQ = (f(w)  ≤g speaker) then DQ is universally quantified  
 
If the speaker according to his/her goals equates the quantificational domain to all deontically possible 
worlds then the imperative is an order. For example, consider again stripse aristera ‘Take a left’ when 
this is uttered by some sort of authority such as a driving instructor. More formally this would be 
interpreted as: It is true that stripse aristera ‘Take a left’ in all deontically possible worlds is true. 
Imperatives in this case are considered a norm that should be followed strictly.  
 
4.2  Non-Veridicality 
Non-veridicality (see Giannakidou 1998) guarantees a situation or action p does not commit the 
speaker and/or the addressee to the realization of p. This property of imperatives and deontic modal 
verbs prepi ‘have to’ and bori ‘may’ that I illustrated in section 3.2.2 eliminates the need of uttering an 
imperative and considering it successful when both speaker and addressee are committed to the 
realization of what  was issued (contra Portner 2007; Ninan 2005). Non-veridicality, on the contrary, 
describes effectively the non-commitment characteristic of imperatives and deontic modal verbs’ alike, 
for example:  
(16) A propositional operator F is veridical iff Fp entails or presupposes that p is 
true in some individual’s epistemic model ME(x); otherwise F is nonveridical. 
 
4.3  Imperative Model of an Individual 
The frame of one’s norms, goals and desires in the world, how one views and considers world is 
provided by his/her class of deontically accessible worlds. This set of standards consist the imperative 
model of an individual. Formally, we interpret them as all those deontically possible worlds that have 
to be or should be for all an individual conforms with or aims to. These worlds’ truth is assessed in an 
imperative model which represents the requirement and preferences’ state of a speaker, formally: 
Definition 1.4 Imperative Model of an individual    
An imperative model of an individual x, MI(x), is a set of worlds w’ accessible from a world w, 
compatible with x’s preferences, requirements, desires, norms and/or goals in w. 
(17) Truth in an Imperative Model    
i. A proposition p is true in an imperative model MI(x) if MI(x) ⊆ p 
  ∀w [w∈MI(x) → w ∈ λw’.p (w’)] 
 
The first part involves all those propositions in the individual’s deontic model MI(x) that should be true 
in his/ her world according to his/her preferences.  
 
ii. A proposition p is false in an imperative model MI(x) if MI(x) ⊆ p 
  
  ∀w [w ∈MD(x) ⊆ w ∈ λw’.p (w’)] 
 
The second part involves all those propositions in the individual’s imperative model MI(x) that that are 
not true in his/ her world according to his/her preferences. In other words, all those things that are not 
part of the normative set in his/her world.  
4.4  Performativeness 
The set of parameters of performative use are described in this section. A deontic modal expression of 
the form Mϕ performs a speech act when two conditions are met: (1) the issuer or a speaker granted the 
authority to fill in for the issuer addresses in 2nd person the target (addressee) of the proposition Mϕ 
and calls the target of the proposition to take a particular action under a normative concept, and (2) the 
state of affairs of the form Mϕ should not be obtained at the time of issuing Mϕ, but rather be an 
unfolding action. 
The performativeness of imperatives depends on a slightly different set of presuppositions: (1) the 
issuer or a speaker granted the authority to fill in for the issuer addresses in 2nd person the target 
(addressee) of the proposition IMP and calls the target of the proposition to take a particular action, (2) 
the issuer is consistent with the ordering source g that determines what is an obligation or permission 
and orders the worlds in the modal base ∩f(w) with respect to the set of propositions that are either 
obligatory or permissible according to him/her (issuer), and returns the worlds that are at least as close 
to the ideal determined by the issuer, and (3) the state of affairs of the proposition IMP, are expected to 
be obtained in a non-past interval. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
First, I introduced the concept of underquantification in analyzing imperatives so we are able to capture 
the meaning of an imperative proposition without posing ambiguity. With underquantification we treat 
modal base as a non-partitioned quantificational domain QD on which the speaker has a crucial role. 
The modal base, the set of propositions related to how things should be will be partitioned according to 
speaker’s preferences and requirements. This is translated formally as the speaker’s ordering source. 
Second, I showed that deontic modality and imperatives are non-veridical propositions; in other words, 
the participants involved are not committed towards the deontic or imperative proposition.  They are 
not committed to the realization of what they describe. This is, to the best of my knowledge, a novel 
observation as one of the main characteristics of modality in general. Another contribution of this paper 
is that, the semantic components of modal interpretation and imperatives can be affected by pragmatic 
factors. More specifically, I showed that, imperatives are a speaker-oriented and direct performative 
expression, while deontic modal expressions are context-oriented, direct or indirect and by speaker’s 
choice performative.  
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